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THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF HABERMAS 
James L. Marsh 
On four different levels, descriptive-eidetic, hermeneutical, structural, and 
political, I show the relevance of Habermas to religious thought. I argue 
against his negative judgment concerning religious belief, show how relig-
ious belief can enhance his own project, demonstrate the way his rationality 
can act as a critical leavening agent on religious belief, and finally argue for 
a reciprocity between Habermas and religious belief. Communicative action 
flowers in a religious commitment to God, and religious belief comes more 
into its own through encounter with the legitimate chastening, vivifying, 
purifying aspects of communicative action. 
At first sight an essay on the religious significance of Habermas might seem 
to be at best irrelevant and at worst an impossibility. For Habermas often 
does not have much to say about religion, and when he does, his discussion 
is mostly critical. According to him, religious belief during the progress of 
modernity has been subject to a "Iinguistification of the sacred" in which its 
ethical core is cognitively redeemed in ethical praxis. Modernity represents 
an Aujhebung of religious belief in which its properly religious aspect is 
rejected and its ethical core retained and sublated into the higher viewpoint 
of communicative praxis.) 
Nonetheless, as I hope to show in the course of this essay, such skepticism 
is premature. Not only is it important for believers to ascertain the validity 
of his arguments for overcoming religion, but there is a relevance of Haber-
mas' theory for religious belief itself, a form of religious ideology critique 
can enhance Habermas' own project, and there are positive openings in 
Habermas' thought that allow for a positive relationship to certain kinds of 
religious belief. There are, then, multiple lines of significance between 
Habermas and religious belief that need to be thematized and evaluated. 
Habermas' social theory as a progressive, synthetic movement from ab-
stract to concrete has four moments: eidetic-descriptive, hermeneutical, struc-
tural, and political. What are the different kinds of rationality as we 
experience, describe, and understand them essentially? What is the best in-
terpretation of rationality as it develops, differentiates itself, and is twisted 
to serve class and group domination in modernity? What is the economic and 
political structure of late capitalism and to what contradictions does it give 
rise? What social movements have emerged in late capitalist modernity that 
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are or can be efficacious? Correspondingly this paper will have four parts in 
which I first layout Habermas' thought and then positively and negatively 
evaluate his position in relation to religious belief. 
The Structure of Communicative Action 
The most abstract level of Habermas' work is his eidetic-descriptive account 
of communicative action, that is, his attempt to articulate the invariant uni-
versals in communicative action that we spontaneously employ and that are 
continuously present to us in an intuitive manner. Such a descripti ve move 
becomes necessary in order to become clear about how we experience ration-
ality in its various forms and serves to evaluate various one-sided accounts 
of rationality. If Husserl's own descriptive turn to "the things themselves" 
became necessary to order to avoid a "philosophizing from on high" proceed-
ing from such questionable premises as the atomistic character of perception 
or the dichotomy of mind and body, then Habermas' descriptive turn in a 
post-modern climate of thought becomes necessary to avoid an "anti-philoso-
phizing from on high" proceeding from such premises as "all judgements are 
expressions of power" or "all rationality is instrumental." Further theorizing 
is necessary and Habermas does plenty of that, but we "get our feet on the 
ground" philosophically through an initial description of how we employ 
different forms and kinds of rationality. In this way he avoids a facile 
reductionism. 2 
What first becomes apparent in communicative action is that it is governed 
by three validity claims, truth, sincerity, and rightness. When I converse with 
somebody, we presuppose that what we are saying is true, is sincere, and right 
or appropriate, in the sense that we are not trying to impose on each other 
arbitrarily or assume authority arbitrarily. 3 
Although in his later work at times Habermas seems to back off from using 
"transcendental" to describe such validity claims, they retain some of the 
functions of the transcendental in that they are necessary, putatively universal 
conditions of the possibility for communicative praxis. They make possible 
an "ideal speech situation," the projection of a regulative ideal of communi-
cation in which no objection, expression, or opinion is excluded from con-
sideration, full symmetry, reciprocity, and equality reign among participants, 
and the only force is that of the better argument. Such an ideal speech situ-
ation is neither empirically real in the sense of being totally realized nor is 
it purely fictional, since it functions as an implicit norm and measure in the 
light of which we can spontaneously evaluate some conversations as closed 
and repressive and others as open and liberated.4 
Related to the three main validity claims are three main possible kinds of 
sentences: constative, regulative, and expressive. The constative sentence, for 
example "John is five feet tall," makes truth claims about the objective world. 
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The regulative speech act, for example "Bush's intervention in the Middle 
East is unjust," articulates what is morally right. The expressive speech act, 
for example "I am happy that you won the award," expresses my subjective 
response to something. Each kind of sentence specializes in or emphasizes 
one validity claim, but the others are present as implicit presuppositions. For 
example, my expression of joy at your success presupposes my recognition 
that you have succeeded.s 
Communicative action includes the above speech acts and their validity 
and is distinguished from an instrumental action oriented to success. Such 
action can only achieve its perlocutionary aims by keeping them secret, and 
always involves a kind of manipulation, coercion, or violence. Contrast the 
parent trying to convince his child to go into medicine in order to fulfill the 
secret needs of the parent for status or prestige with the parent who is honestly 
open with his son about his career choice, his own desires and expectations 
for his son, and his own commitment that the son do what best suits him and 
fulfills him. There is a non-violence and non-coerciveness about communi-
cative action that instrumental action implicitly trades on and presupposes, 
even in arguing that "all communication is violent." For the claim to have 
any validity at all, it tacitly presupposes a non-violent process of persuasion 
in which the better argument wins. Otherwise the claim has no more validity 
than that of a Chilean prisoner tortured into making the admission that Pino-
chet is a just ruler.6 
There are many positive merits to Habermas' conception of communicative 
action. Such a conception allows him to do justice to the different forms and 
kinds of rationality in a way that avoids modern and post-modern reduction-
isms. Nonetheless some reservations do arise. We may note the exclusion in 
Habermas of metaphysical-religious constative sentences such as "God ex-
ists," expressive sentences such as "I love God," and regulative sentences 
such as "God's will is that I do this." On a strictly descriptive level there 
seems to be no reason to exclude these sentences as legitimate examples of 
communicative praxis. Yet Habermas excludes them as legitimate because of 
presuppositions informing his descriptive account. Such presuppositions most 
likely include (and here I am interpreting and extrapolating) Kant's critique 
of metaphysics, Feuerbach's critique of religion, and Marx's critique of re-
ligion as ideology. More precisely Habermas' Marxism, albeit reconstructed, 
informs his descriptive account in a way that may prejudice it illegitimately.7 
I hasten to add that there is nothing methodologically illegitimate in having 
such presuppositions, because I do not think that a totally presuppositionless 
account is possible. What is possible, however, in Habermas' own spirit in 
the context of the ideal speech situation is a questioning of such presupposi-
tions. Do they withstand the force of the better argument? It shall be the 
burden of the rest of my paper to show that they do not. 
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I am raising at this point the hypothesis of a fourth domain, perhaps most 
adequately conceived not as running alongside normal constative, expressive, 
and regulative sentences indicating three different worlds, objective, subjec-
tive, and social, but as grounding, surrounding, and rendering completely 
intelligible these three worlds. 
Adding to the plausibility of such a hypothesis is Arendt's criticism of 
Marxism in general and, by implication, Habermas in particular of being 
insufficiently attentive to and appreciative of the contemplative, too onesid-
edly focused on praxis in the threefold forms of art, political action, and labor 
informed by science. We question Habermas here for being too uncritically 
Marxist in focusing on objective spirit and excluding absolute spirit too much, 
especially its domains of religion and metaphysics. Is Habermas too uncriti-
cally interested in reason as a form of world transformation and not enough 
as a form of world disclosure? I am reminded here of Adorno's self-critique, 
insofar as he asks whether the Marxist utopia is just capitalist busyness and 
bustle democratized and more equally distributed? Perhaps true utopia is just 
closer to "Rien faire comme une bete, lying on water and looking at the sky, 
being nothing else, without any further definition and fulfillment."8 
We have to be careful here to be fair to Habermas. He docs admit to an 
aesthetic, contemplative component to rationality; also a form of discourse 
or conversation in the constative domain in which there is an aiming at the 
truth for its own sake, and, of course, science has a theoretical component. 
Nonetheless the questions persist. Is significant justice done to a kind of 
metaphysical-religious questioning of the whole? Do even the purely theo-
retical moments in Habermas arising in discourse about the moral, scientific, 
and aesthetic domains take their bearings too much from world-transforming 
praxis? Is there a danger on the descriptive level of excluding too much world 
disclosing forms of rationality (Arendt in her critique undoubtedly has in 
mind as an alternative a receptive, meditative Heideggerian Denken about 
Being) and emphasizing too much world transforming forms of rationality? 
Again on a strictly descriptive level there seems to be no reason for such 
exclusion and emphasis. Such contemplative, receptive, meditative question-
ing of Being does go on and needs to be described. Arendt does exactly this 
in her posthumously published work on thought and willing, in which such 
contemplation and thought serve as necessary complements to praxis in its 
different forms, political, aesthetic, economic.9 
A related issue is whether Habermas' conception of individuality is too thin 
and impoverished. Using Mead's conception of socialization, Habermas dis-
tinguishes between a socialized "Me" and a creative, free "I" not reducible 
to the content of such socialization and able to resist it. Such a distinction 
suggests an opening into an existential phenomenological reflection on inte-
riority, which Habermas does not take. Such a path of reflection articulates 
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a domain of human experience that itself can plausibly be said to open up to 
and be completed in a metaphysical-religious affirmation and commitment. 
Kierkegaard's account of the three states of existence, aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious; and Lonergan's account of conversion, intellectual, moral, and 
religious, are probably the best recent examples. We move from a finite 
individuality to existential-phenomenological explication of such interiority 
leading to metaphysical-religious affirmation and commitment as the fullest 
actualization and completion of such interiority. Not to make such an affirma-
tion and commitment is to short-circuit and arbitrarily limit the fundamental 
human drive to intelligibility and value, or, in Habermas' terms, to introduce 
an arbitrary block and limit into the ideal speech situation, which requires 
that no a priori limits be put on questioning. 1o 
Habermas, of course, has his own reasons for not using such an existential 
phenomenological account of subjectivity: the fascism of Heidegger, the va-
lidity of a shift from a philosophy of consciousness to one of language, and 
the link of phenomenology to constative or instrumental reason. These rea-
sons do not seem cogent to me. The validity of phenomenology, even of 
Heidegger's, does not have to be rejected because of his fascism; there is a 
certain transcendence of the philosophy to the real person that for good 
hermeneutical reasons we need to affirm. It seems to me that Habermas 
overstates the significance of the linguistic turn insofar as he either denies 
or at least fails to thematize that there are mental acts such as understanding, 
judging, and choosing that are causative of and completed by external ges-
tural or linguistic expression but are not reducible to such expression. The 
true reality, therefore, is "consciousness-expression." 
It also seems to me that phenomenology is not inevitably monological or 
confined to instrumental reason. Schutz and others have developed a phe-
nomenology of the social world, Husserl has criticized scientism and posi-
,tivism for claiming to monopolize the definition of rationality, and 
Sokolowski has recently worked out a phenomenology of moral action. Prop-
erly understood, existentialism and phenomenology practice a descriptive, 
eidetic sensitivity to the multiple kinds of human rationality and action simi-
lar to Habermas'. They are allies, not adversaries." 
To return to the main thread of my argument, I have developed elsewhere 
the idea of a domain of interiority that is structured by relationships of 
experience, understanding, judgement, and decision. For example, I see the 
apple fall, I formulate hypotheses to explain its falling, I verify these in 
experiments, and I decide to publish the results. I have argued, second, that 
such a transcendental structure is present in the various patterns of experi-
ence, aesthetic, scientific, moral, in a way that Habermas does not articulate. 
For example, I hear the poem read, I begin to grasp its meaning, I judge that 
my interpretation is true or that the poem is a good one, and I decide to read 
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more of this poet. There is thus a principle of unity between and among the 
various patterns of experience that Habermas misses. 12 
Third, questions concerning ultimate reality and meaning inevitably arise. 
In Lonergan's terms, "Is being ultimately intelligible?" or "Does an act of 
unrestricted understanding exist?" In Kierkegaard's terms, we might ask 
whether there is a Being whom I can completely trust and believe in and love, 
Who can satisfy completely my infinite passion, Who can deliver the aesthetic 
from its conflict with the ethical in me. Here I would insist that our commit-
ment to the unlimited questioning of the ideal speech situation cannot exclude 
such questions as illegitimate. They are not meaningless because we can 
understand them, they are not absurd because they are not self-contradictory, 
and they are not illegitimate on positivistic grounds because Habermas has 
already rejected positivism. There is not just one form of rationality, scien-
tific, but three. I would ask, "Why not a fourth?,,1J 
Peukert has argued that Habermas' own project requires a "yes" to the 
above questions. Operating as a presupposition of Habermas' communicative 
ethic is unconditional solidarity with all other human beings, past, present, 
and future. Such solidarity is rooted in the temporal aspects of the ideal 
speech situation, as well as the recognition of the other as an equal partner 
in speech, inviolable and free. Imagine, Peukert argues, a situation in which 
the ethical demands of communicative action were realized in full economic, 
social, and political democracy. In this situation, how is solidarity possible 
with the dead, oppressed, and innocent victims of past generations? Short of 
some kind of present solidarity with them as currently existing, do they not 
become mere means to our happy socialist present in a way which contradicts 
the unconditionally and universality of communicative praxis? If we try to 
forget them to remain in such a present, do we not contradict again such 
unconditionality and universality? How can a happiness based on evasion be 
true happiness? 
Only the affirmation of past victims of oppression as currently existing and 
God as the guarantor of such existence delivers communicative praxis from 
its own contradictions. "The reality disclosed in communicative action, as-
serted as the saving reality for others and at the same time as the reality that 
through this salvation of the other makes possible one's own temporal exist-
ence unto death, must be called God." Such an analysis of human action, 
Peukert goes on to argue, is barely conceivable without the Old Testament 
and New Testament as hermeneutic revelations of such a God. 14 
If this all too brief sketch of an argument with and against Habermas is 
correct, then the following seems to be true: 1) At the eidetic-descriptive level 
there exists a fourth realm, the metaphysical-religious, that serves to ground 
the objective, subjective, and social realms. 2) On the same descriptive level, 
there is a contemplative dimension to which Habermas does not do justice. 
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3) There is an existential depth to individuality that must be affirmed and that 
opens in its questioning and choosing onto the transcendent. 4) Communica-
tive ethics finds its ultimate completion and fulfillment in the affirmation of 
and commitment to such transcendence. 
He rmeneutics 
Because of problematic decisions, presuppositions, and exclusions on the 
descriptive, eidetic level, Habermas is already predisposed to interpret mod-
ernity in a certain way as a "Iinguistification of the sacred" that separates out 
and cognitively redeems ethical content and leaves behind specifically relig-
ious reference, belief, and commitment. Those belong to a superseded pre-
modern stage of history governed by metaphysical-religious worldviews. If 
one rejects Habermas' problematic assumptions, then a different hermeneu-
tical reading of modernity becomes possible. Habermas' interpretation of 
modernity as a contradictory tension between forward moves in learning and 
a pathological colonization of life-world by system requires and implies a 
metaphysical-religious dimension. IS 
The key word in Habermas' account of modernity is "differentiation" 1) 
among the spheres of aesthetic, scientific, and moral knowledge-cultural ra-
tionalization; 2) between cultural rationalization and social rationalization, 
in which purposive rational action, action utilizing technically chosen means 
ordered to technically achievable ends, is institutionalized in the economy 
and state; 3) between life-world and system, understood here as a functional 
connection among unintended effects of human choices (an economic crash 
or depression is a good example); 4) between a beneficial mediating of life-
world by system and colonizing of life-world by system, in which the im-
peratives of capitalist or state socialist modernization impinge on, disturb, 
and corrupt spheres of the life-world. By "life-world" I here mean the social 
whole to which actors have access in a first person, intuitive manner. As I 
speak to you in this room, this room opens onto a corridor in a building, 
which itself is in a university in a city. You and I share a common language 
and traditions, cultural, political, philosophical, religious, upon which we 
draw when we communicate. "Life-world" is to "communicative action" as 
implicit to explicit, pre-thematic to thematic, taken-for-granted to question-
able, context to figure, indeterminate to determinate. 16 
Modernity is a contradictory blending of progress and decline, enlighten-
ment and pathology, rationality and irrationality. In Habermas' view, his ac-
count is more comprehensive and nuanced than either an optimistic, 
harmonizing Parson ian account or a negative, post-modern account. Moder-
nity is progressive in that forward moves in aesthetic, moral, and scientific 
learning have occurred and have been institutionalized. Modernity is patho-
logical in that these very forward moves have been twisted in the interests 
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of class or group domination. Habermas' Marxism comes in here to save 
modernist rationality. It is not modernist rationality as such that is the problem 
but its misuse and narrowing in the service of class and group dominationY 
We have, then, four possible ways of relating to the modern: conservative 
regression, liberal commitment to a contradictory status quo, post-modern 
transcendence, and a dialectical, Habermasian "critical modernism." If the 
first three are inadequate, then Habermas' is the most preferable. Modernity 
and the Enlightenment are projects which need to be completed and re-
deemed, not rejected and scorned. Although Habermas is somewhat vague 
and indeterminate about his political program, it, in keeping with his Marx-
ism, points toward significant economic and social and political democrati-
zation. Because of the complex nature of modernity, such democratization 
will inevitably be accompanied by representation and expertise and elements 
of bureaucracy and market. Because differentiation of system from life-world 
is a positive, forward move in modernity and market and bureaucracy are 
elements of system, they would survive in any future democratization of 
society. There is a "Hegelian" realism that Habermas brings in here to qualify 
any naive Marxist hopes about total participatory democracy. IS 
As far as it goes, therefore, Habermas' account of modernity is illuminating 
and valid, a light shining in a darkness characterized by facile, contradictory 
attempts to transcend and reject the modern. But his account, in my opinion, 
does not go far enough and stands as inadequate by Habermas' own herme-
neutical standards of comprehensiveness and respect for nuance. Taking a cue 
from Taylor in his recent, magisterial Sources of the Self, we may ask whether 
there is not a fourth strand of the modern that has been differentiated, the 
ontological-religious, in addition to the aesthetic, moral, and scientific. Once 
again quaternian rather than trinitarian thinking.19 
Here I would have in mind the following phenomena, though I am not 
claiming an exhaustive description here: the separation of church from state 
and economy in a way that allows for the greater autonomy of the former, 
the emergence of distinctively modern metaphysico-religious forms of 
thought such as Kierkegaard, Marcel, Lonergan, Barthes, Gutierrez, and Tillich, 
the interaction between these forms of thought and the wider religious com-
munity, the mutual questioning of world by church and church by world such 
that the modern principles of freedom, reflexivity, and critique enter into the 
life of the churches and religious belief acts as a leavening influence on the 
world, allowing it to be more critical of the fetishes of money, sex, and power; 
and the emergence of distinctively modern political-religious movements led 
by such people as Berrigan. King. Day, and Camaro. 20 
Habermas' reply to this claim, of course, would be his thesis of the "lin-
guistification of the sacred." There is an ethical core to religious belief that 
settles out in the course of modernity's development, leaving the proper 
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religious reference and meaning of such belief in the dustbin of an outmoded 
pre-modern age. 21 
But has such a discarding occurred? To read the writings of a Kierkegaard 
or Berrigan or Gutierrez or MoItman is to witness an ethics essentially linked 
to and profoundly involved with religious belief. Such belief has not dropped 
out but is the central motivating core. Maybe Habermas, because of the 
predilections mentioned in the first part of this essay, thinks that it should 
have dropped out or that it will drop out, but so far it has not. Without such 
predilections, does not a more comprehensive hermeneutic of modernity point 
to quaternity, not trinity? Is not the metaphysical-religious, if not alive and 
well, at least alive and kicking?22 
Here I would not reject the phrase "linguistification of the sacred" but 
would qualify and differentiate it: 1) As indicating a complete or mostly 
complete jettisoning of religious reference and meaning, the phrase is false. 
2) As indicating a certain process of secularization, this phrase is legitimate. 
Such secularization, however, is the differentiation of the religious-meta-
physical from other spheres of human endeavor and does not imply the denial 
of the metaphysical-religious. 3) As indicating a widespread theoretical and 
practical atheistic, reductionistic interpretation of such secularization, the 
phrase is true, but this interpretation is just one strand of the process of 
secularization. Another is metaphysical-religious. 4) As indicating that cer-
tain forms of metaphysics and religious belief deserve to die, those that are 
ideological, escapist, and do not relate sympathetically to and learn from 
legitimate modern discoveries about freedom, subjectivity, rationality, and 
critique, the phrase is true. For example, the true God is not the bourgeois 
God of the ruling classes or a God that despises women, racial minorities, or 
the poor. Rather, in keeping with legitimate feminist, post-modern, and Marx-
ist discoveries and critiques of modernity, the true God is on the side of the 
oppressed. There is a "preferential option for the poor" that is essential to 
any properly modern form of religious beliefY 
5) The legitimate forms of religious belief that deserve to survive have 
learned from the modern and vice versa. Here I think of Lonergan's use of 
Kant, Kierkegaard's of Hegel, Metz's of Benjamin, Dussel's of Marx. In this 
sense of a mutual testing in which religious belief has passed through the 
crucible of modern questioning and critique, there is a "Iinguistification of 
the sacred." In my opinion, the best formulation of such religious belief is 
Tracy's "revisionism" in which there is total questioning of Church by world 
and world by Church. Religious belief allows itself to use and to be brought 
into question by modern questions, insights, and methodologies. At the same 
time religious belief functions as a transcendent reference point allowing us 
to be critical of simplistic forms of progress trampling underfoot the poor, 
the homeless, the oppressed. 24 
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The latter point is quite important and needs to be emphasized. Employed 
in the context of a critical modernist religious belief, even pre-modern relig-
ious texts do not have to be exercises in a conservative nostalgia trip, but are 
themselves sources of a dangerous memory bringing into question certain 
structures of modern domination. Thus Christ's description of the Last Judge-
ment and those who will sit at the right hand and left hand of his Father brings 
into question modern tendencies to valorize too much the rich, the victorious, 
and the powerful and to ignore the poor, the defeated, the weak. Mary's 
contemplative, receptive "be it done unto me according to thy word" brings 
into question our modern fetishizing of productivity, business, "busyness," 
efficiency, usefulness. Christ's warning that it is harder for a rich person to 
get to heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle warns us 
about the dangers of reducing Christianity to the measure of the bourgeois, 
middle class subject.25 
Hermeneutic receptivity to religious sources, then, is essential but so also 
are suspicion and critique both of world and Church: critique of the world 
insofar as it deifies or fetishizes such finite realities as money, sex, and power; 
and critique of the Church insofar as its ideas, institutions, and practices 
conflict with the genuine prophetic content of Old and New Testaments. If 
Tracy is correct in asserting that there is an ideology critique internal to 
religious belief and texts, then such modern insights and methodologies of 
suspicion and critique can enhance, explicate, and serve such critique. For 
example, using the insights of feminism, can we not ask whether there is a 
solid theological basis for ordaining women, or is the justification for not 
doing so just a fancy, disguised form of male domination? Using the results 
of a liberation theology informed by positive appropriation of Marx and 
Western Marxism, can we not, as Boff has done, criticize many practices of 
the Catholic Church as undemocratic, dominating, and unjust?26 
Crisis Theory 
Here we consider the economic and political structure of late capitalism and 
the contradictions to which it gives rise. There is a certain parallelism and 
connection as we move from abstract to concrete in Habermas' thought. In 
relation to traditional Marxism, his description of communicative action re-
duces science-technology, in itself and in its use by labor as a form of pur-
posive rational action, to simply a part within a more comprehensive theory 
including the aesthetic-expressive and the moral-political. There is similarly 
a de-absolutizing but not a complete rejection of science and labor carried 
out in his reconstruction of historical materialism, in which moral-political 
learning becomes the pace-setter for historical development. Similarly on the 
level of a hermeneutic of modernity science is distinguished from morality 
and art as one form of rationality but not the only form, and purposive 
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rationality in social rationalization as that occurs in the economy and state is 
distinct from cultural rationalization. Labor and science, which in traditional 
Marxism too often tend to become the whole story, are subject to a general 
Aufhebung in Habermas, retention, negation, and transcendence.27 
This fundamental rethinking of Marxism that remains in some sense still 
Marxist continues on the more concrete, political level of crisis theory, in 
which Habermas develops an interpretation and critique of late capitalism. 
His theory of communicative action, theory of historical materialism, and 
hermeneutics of modernity give him the tools to reconceptualize the notion 
of crisis in a way that is fruitful. Here again there is a relativizing but not 
denial of the economic; other kinds of possible crises in late capitalism are 
rationality, legitimation, and motivational crises. Indeed late capitalism, be-
cause of its orientation toward total administration, creates the possibility for 
other kinds of crisis not envisioned by a more traditional Marxist analysis. 
The pessimism in Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, for example, about the 
possibility of meaningful social change may be seen from a Habermasian 
point of view as manifesting the deficiencies of traditional Marxism, even 
though Marcuse in many ways is not a traditional Marxist. Nonetheless he is 
wedded to a traditional account to the extent that if late capitalism seems to 
close off the possibility of economic crisis and to incorporate labor into its 
bosom, pessimism about the possibility of meaningful social change seems 
to be a logical conclusion. Habermas, on the other hand, is committed to a 
more dialectically hopeful account of late capitalism. His positive endorse-
ment of communicative action, history and modernity prepares him to see 
positive elements in late capitalism not accessible to a more traditional Marx-
ist account. 28 
A rationality crisis, for example, is like an economic crisis in being a crisis 
primarily in system identity, a breakdown in late capitalism conceived as a 
well-running, functional, objective structure. Unlike economic crisis, how-
ever, rationality crisis is mediated by the state. Carter's inability simultane-
ously to control both unemployment and inflation is a rationality crisis.29 
Legitimation and motivation crises are crises in social identity based upon 
the willingness or unwillingness of people to support and actively participate 
in the social and political life of society. A legitimation crisis arises in the 
modern state because of the contradiction between the imperative to secure 
capitalist accumulation and the imperative to secure legitimation through 
recourse to a communicative ethic institutionalized to some extent in the 
democratic institutions and practices of the modern state. A contradiction arises 
between particular capitalist imperatives and universal criteria of a communica-
tive ethic stressing the good of all. If, for example, some kinds of military 
spending very profitable for capitalist firms cannot be justified through rational 
discussion, then problems of legitimation arise for such spending.30 
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For Habermas legitimation deficits finally are based on motivation crises 
that are endemic to late capitalism. Such crises occur through a negative 
erosion of attitudes favorable to capitalism such as a work ethic and individu-
alism and asceticism and the positive emergence of values and practices in 
tension with late capitalism such as science, communicative ethics, and mod-
ern art. Their commitment to rational verification, normative universality, and 
disinterested aesthetic enjoyment are in fundamental tension with the limited 
arbitrariness, particularism, and utilitarianism of bourgeois rationality.3l 
Once again effectively operative in producing crisis tendencies are the same 
three elements of modern western rationality, science, morality, and art. Once 
again, rather than triplicity, why not quaternity? Could we not argue for 
enlightened religious belief and practice as another powerful source of mo-
tivation dysfunctional for the maintenance of the capitalist system? Consider 
the service of a Dorothy Day, the resistance of a Berrigan, and ,the protest of 
a King. Do we not have in the fidelity to the desire to know culminating in 
religious belief, in the religious preferential option for the poor, and in dis-
interested contemplative prayer powerful motives for resisting capitalism that 
complement, enhance and complete Habermas' communicative ethic? If some 
have found this ethic too formalistic, too lacking in content to be effectively 
motivating, is not such a metaphysical-religious motivation a marvelous, 
strong, additional and deepening form of motivation?32 
We have to be careful here. There clearly are certain forms of religious 
belief that act as ideological supports of capitalism reflecting and legitimizing 
its privatism, individualism, and conformism. Such forms of belief, however, 
are not only inadequate by the standards of the ideology critique, communi-
tarianism and the solidarity present within religious belief itself, but also are 
inadequate by the standards of a critical modernity interacting creatively in 
mutual critique and enlightenment with such belief. As we have seen, certain 
forms of religious beliefs deserve to die because they have been untrue to 
their own radical prophetic substance. A Judaism or Christianity that has 
become merely ideological is untrue to itself as Jewish or Christian.33 
It makes sense here on this level to talk, first, about the way secular 
ideology critique can benefit religion not only by reminding it of its own 
radical, social, prophetic substance and giving it tools to articulate and deepen 
such substance, but also by purifying its notion of God. God is no longer a 
cozy father in the sky, an escape for neurotics, and a prop for the ruling 
classes, but rather a loving Freedom inviting me, you, us to become free in 
a process of individual and social transformation. Jesus Christ Liberator!34 
It makes sense also to discuss the way religious belief drawing on its 
ideological critical resources can itself contribute to and be ideology critique. 
If there is, as even Lonergan admits, a domain of freedom, love, and faith 
beyond rationality and cognition, then such faith oriented to its religious 
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"object" enables us to cntlclze tendencies on the part of rationality itself 
toward self-aggrandizement, domination and fetishization. Here I am think-
ing not only of obvious deformations of rationality such as technocracy, 
positivism, and scientism but even the temptation of a secular communicative 
ethic to set itself up as the sole guide and norm, to deify itself, to be insuf-
ficiently receptive to alien, irrational, aesthetic, revelatory aspects of self and 
world. One can with Habermas perform a rational interpretation and critique 
of capitalism. But what if reason itself becomes the problem? Reason criti-
cizes the capital fetish or state socialist fetish but then sets itself up as a fetish 
or god. 35 
To illustrate the role religious belief can play in a critique of society, we 
may compare Kierkegaard and Berrigan. Kierkegaard played a prophetic 
religious role in relationship to the nineteenth century Danish Church and 
society similar to that of Berrigan in relationship to the Catholic Church and 
American society in the twentieth century. 
Kierkegaard's critique of the homogeneous mass society and public of the 
"Present Age" parallels Berrigan's critique of and resistance to the Ameri-
can-military industrial behemoth; both were forms of religious ideology cri-
tique forcing believers to ask themselves what happens when religion simply 
becomes a flatterer of the age, a servant of the status quo, a slave to current 
economic-political fashion. In their hands religious belief becomes a power-
ful source of critique and resistance to a corrupt economic-political status 
quO. 36 
Habermas would reply, of course, that he can already affirm fallibilism and 
the aesthetic and nature from within the structure of his own theory. And there 
is all the difference as well between a "Protestant," Kierkegaardian tendency 
to find secular, natural reason to be limited and sinful and a ''Catholic,'' 
Thomistic tendency to validate such a reason and to go as far as it will take 
one. Yet even a Catholic can ask whether there is not a natural pridefulness, 
if not in reason itself, then in the human being who tries to live rationally 
without faith? And is not this pridefulness a worm that can eat away at even 
the most righteous of social reform and revolutions? And even if Habermas 
can rightfully say that he builds fallibilism into his theory, is there not a 
difference between the conceptual recognition and the existential living out 
of that fallibilism? Does not communicative ethics itself, therefore, need to 
be subjected to a religious ideology critique and to incorporate that into itself 
or, more adequately, allow itself to be incorporated into that critique?37 
Social Movements 
What social movements emerge from the contradictory structure of late capi-
talism that have a chance to bring about meaningful social change? We note 
here that just as there is a relativizing of the claims of labor and science on 
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descriptive, historical, and structural levels, so also is there on the level of 
concrete, political action. Like Marx, Habermas takes it to be a responsibility 
of critical theory to indicate systematically what groups or movements pre-
sent the best possibilities for social change. For Marx, the answer was the 
working class; for Habermas it is social movements such as feminism, civil 
rights, ecology, anti-war, and anti-nuclear that burst into bloom in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.38 
Just as Habermas removes an economist, productivist bias from Marxism 
on the first three levels discussed above, so also on this level. Indeed this 
articulation of these first three levels prepares him to look for potentially 
liberating groups outside of and distinct from the economic sector. There is 
more than a suggestion, following Offe, that crisis is more likely the further 
away one is from the economic sector, especially the big monopoly portion 
of that sector. Capitalism has done so well in containing economic crisis that 
one could expect, on the assumption that capitalism is a unified, contradictory 
social system, contradictions to break out elsewhere. The events of the 1960s 
and early 1970s bear Habermas out. Universities, not corporations, were the 
more likely sources of conflict; students, not workers, were more likely 
agents of resistance to late capitalism and all of its pomps; feminist groups, 
not labor unions, are the leading progressive movement today; damage to the 
environment, not happiness in the workplace, is the more potent issue. 39 
Habermas, and along with him Offe, has better than anyone else provided 
the revised conceptual, Marxist framework for understanding such events and 
movements. If communicative action is aesthetic and practical as well as 
scientific and technical, if moral-political learning is even more of a pace 
setter in historical evolution than scientific-economic learning, if modernity 
has institutionalized the differences among scientific, moral, and aesthetic 
learning, if crises can be legitimational and motivational as well as economic 
and rational, then it makes sense to expect that social movements are the most 
likely agents of liberating social change. 
Capitalism has engaged in a colonization of the life-world, imposing its 
logic and commodification on spheres intrinsically alien to it such as educa-
tion, art, culture, and politics. Thus the person most likely to make it to 
Harvard and Yale is not the best and the brightest but the richest and best-
born. The program that is shown on television is not the most aesthetically 
stimulating and socially provocative, but that which is the least threatening 
and most profitable to the sponsor. Universities more and more are not places 
to pursue the examined life but rather launching pads for Greenwich and Wall 
Street. Politics more and more centers not on discussion of real issues but on 
"selling the President" or congressman or senator.40 
Thus, Habermas argues, if our life-world is colonized in this way, we would 
expect protest potentials to emerge not in an old politics concerned with 
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economic distribution but in a new politics concerned with quality or life, or 
as he puts it, "the grammar of forms of life." If one thinks, as I do, that the 
potential for economic and rationality crisis has increased since the early 
1970s with such events as OPEC's raising of oil prices, recession, unemploy-
ment, and inflation, which all reflect a cessation in the expansion of late 
capitalism taking place from 1955 - 1970 and a contraction from 1970 to the 
present, then workers as workers might have more of a role to play. But, 
because of the changed structure of late capitalism, they are no longer privi-
leged or even the most likely agents of social change.41 
Habermas distinguishes here between more conservative movements such 
as proposition 13 in California based on defense of property and more pro-
gressive social movements such as the peace movement or feminism. Here 
we need only to add and emphasize, in a way that he does not, the contribution 
of religion to both of these tendencies. The Pro-Life movement, because of 
its unenlightened stance on life outside of the womb such as the poor, unem-
ployed, African-Americans, women, and the victims of imperialism, would 
count as conservative. The religious contribution to the civil rights move-
ment, peace movement, and ecology movement would count as progressive. 
Again the names of Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, and Daniel Berrigan 
in the U.S. and the movements they have spawned come to mind, including 
the recent Plowshares movement which Martin Sheen has joined. Properly 
conceived, interpreted, and articulated, religious belief has been, is and can 
be a progressive force for social change. When we shift our gaze to the Third 
World in such areas as Latin America, then progressive movements for lib-
eration become other obvious instances. As the film Romero showed, Arch-
bishop Romero went through a radical political conversion in which he 
realized that the Christianity most worthy of the name is that which stands 
explicitly on the side of the poor and oppressed against the rich and the 
oppressors.42 
Conclusion 
We have discovered multiple lines of significance between Habermas and 
religious belief. First of all, we have criticized his negative judgement con-
cerning religious belief. Neither on descriptive nor hermeneutical nor struc-
tural nor political levels does his argument work. 
Indeed we have discovered, second, that religious belief can contribute to 
Habermas' project, making it more consistent and comprehensive, supplying 
another resource for critique, providing a strong resistance to late capitalist 
exploitation, and acting as an ingredient in liberating social movements. Third, 
Habermasian modernity and rationality can act as a critical leavening agent on 
religious belief, enabling it to discover and enhance its own ideology critique, 
reflectivity, social consciousness, notion of God and option for the poor. 
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Finally, what the above points suggest is a reciprocity between Habermas 
and religious belief; communicative action flowers and completes itself in a 
religious commitment to God, "a being in love with God"; Religious belief 
comes more into its own through encounter with the legitimate chastening, 
vivifying, purifying aspects of communicative action.43 
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